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Abstract
Policy responses to the global financial crisis can be divided into pro- and counter-
cyclical approaches. The former advocates reducing public spending in times of financial
constraints. The latter approach advocates public spending to boost the economy. Using
public opinion (N¼ 23,652) data from 27 EU member countries, we empirically test a
model for citizen preferences for reducing spending in public services versus govern-
ment investment in measures to boost the economy as a response to the financial crisis.
We look at individual- and country-level determinants of attitudes to savings in public
services, and concentrate on four groups of explanations: political disaffection, ideology,
self-interest, and macro-economic conditions. It was found that political disaffection and
the respondent’s ideological orientation both have effects on preferences, as well as
whether one experiences economic strain or receives welfare services. Macro-eco-
nomic conditions, such as a country’s government deficit level, public debt or public
expenditure have, surprisingly, no effect on citizens’ financial policy preferences. We
discuss the implications of our results for public administration theory and practice.
Points for practitioners
The article analyses citizens’ preferred government reactions to the financial crisis. It
distinguishes between reducing public spending and measures to boost the economy.
It was found that macro-economic conditions matter very little for these preferences.
In fact, explanations for these attitudes and preferences need to be looked for primarily
at the individual level, not the country level. Preferences for or against savings in public
services are largely influenced by ideological dispositions, age, education, overall levels
of political trust, and whether citizens are (potential) beneficiaries of welfare services.
The article contributes to understanding why citizens support or oppose pro- or
counter-cyclical policy measures to emerge from the crisis.
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Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis has forced governments to take a variety of measures. At one
and the same time, they are forced to reduce spending on public services in order to
curb public debt and beneﬁts, yet have to expand spending in order to support a
growing group of unemployed citizens. Targeted reductions in public sector spend-
ing have gone hand in hand with massive investments in measures to stabilize the
ﬁnancial sector. Increased taxes in order to balance the budget have coincided with
targeted tax cuts to stimulate selected economic sectors. Policy responses to the
global ﬁnancial crisis can be divided into pro- and counter-cyclical approaches
(Armingeon, 2012). The former advocates reducing public spending and making
savings in times of ﬁnancial constraints. The latter approach advocates public
spending to boost the economy. Not only do policy makers have to make tough
choices, citizens too need to decide what they are and are not willing to sacriﬁce.
Despite austerity, demands for more and better public services remain as present as
ever (Pollitt, 2010). In this context, Moore et al. (2010) talk about a ‘loss aversion’
on the part of citizens to explain their reluctance to allow cutbacks in public ser-
vices. Yet, academic research on citizen attitudes towards the ﬁnancial crisis, and
government responses to the crisis more speciﬁcally, is still in its infancy.
In this article we analyse determinants of citizen policy preferences regarding
government responses to the crisis and more speciﬁcally pro- versus counter-cycli-
cal responses in 27 EU member countries. We empirically test whether citizens’
partisan ideology, political disaﬀection and personal self-interest inﬂuence patterns
of attitudes towards spending decisions when they come in response to a major
economic crisis. We also examine whether those views relate to countries’ macro-
economic conditions. To do so, we use opinion data on public preferences for
savings in public services versus public investments in order to boost the economy
in times of crisis. We ﬁrst review the literature, develop a theoretical model for
empirical testing and then introduce the data from 27 EU countries. Data is ana-
lysed looking at both individual-level and country-level variables. We then evaluate
our ﬁndings and address limitations of this study and avenues for further research.
Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.
Explaining attitudes to public spending and austerity:
four hypotheses
Since the eruption of the ﬁnancial crisis, we have seen a gradual and in most recent
years an exponential growth in research looking into the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial
crisis on public services. Various authors have looked into or hypothesized
about eﬀects of the crisis on political and administrative decision-making and
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coordination (Fleischer and Parrado, 2010), politicization (Peters et al., 2011), or
public service bargains (Lodge and Hood, 2012). Other streams of research have
looked into government responses to the crisis, both in general (Khademian, 2011;
Kickert, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d; Massey, 2011; Peters, 2011; Posner and
Blo¨ndal, 2012) and in terms of ﬁscal measures (Armingeon, 2012). The long-term
eﬀects of the crisis on public spending remain to be discovered. Public attitudes and
preferences, however, have not yet received much attention.
Theoretically, we relate our research to the wider body of research in public
administration and political science on the (desired) role of government and the
preferred size and composition of government spending, and on the determinants
of government spending (for the latter, see, e.g. Busemeyer, 2007; Castles and
McKinlay, 1976). This literature can be roughly divided into two streams. One
looks at attitudes to government intervention in society and the economy and
support for ‘big government’; the other looks at generic spending preferences
and support for welfare spending more speciﬁcally. Our hypotheses will be derived
from these bodies of research and will concentrate on ideology, self-interest, pol-
itical disaﬀection and macro-economic factors. This article adds to that literature
by speciﬁcally asking for citizens’ opinions in a time of major ﬁscal crisis, rather
than for attitudes to public spending in non-turbulent times.
As a result of the availability of large multi-country opinion datasets such as the
World Values Survey or the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data,
various researchers have looked at public attitudes towards the size of government,
and why some people are more supportive of ‘big government’ than others (see e.g.
Borre and Scarbrough, 1995; Martin, 2011). Overall, there appears to be a consid-
erable degree of ambivalence in opinions about the preferred role of government
(Gainous et al., 2008). A substantial number of studies have asked citizens what
they think government should spend its money on, with this research tradition
especially established with regard to welfare spending (Confalonieri and Newton,
1995; Jacoby, 1994; Shapiro and Young, 1989). Research on citizens’ spending
preferences, both in general and in relation to welfare spending, suggests that
attitudes may be inﬂuenced by two major factors. The ﬁrst argument emphasizes
the role of more general ideological dispositions in shaping citizens’ preferences.
The other emphasizes elements of self-interest in the formation of attitudes to
spending.
The role of ideology
Partisan identiﬁcation has been a recurrent explanatory factor, in the literatures on
both the scope of government and attitudes to welfare spending. These two bodies
of literature presume that behind personal ideology lie more general value systems
that determine right and wrong in terms of the relationship between the state, the
individual and other institutions (Battaglio and Legge, 2008, 2009; Hasenfeld and
Raferty, 1989), and numerous studies do support this thesis (Feldman and
Steenbergen, 2001; Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Jacoby, 1994). Using data from
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the National Election Study in the US, Jacoby (1994), for example, found that a
symbolic politics orientation, such as party identiﬁcation or liberal-conservative
self-placement, have a strong impact on citizens’ attitudes towards government
spending on social welfare. Battaglio and Legge (2008, 2009) looked at citizen
support for electricity and hospital privatization across a set of industrialized
countries. They conclude that support for privatization reforms can be partially
explained by a combination of ideological predispositions and underlying values.
Francken (1986) looked into Dutch citizens’ preferences for public spending and
found such preferences to be related to political aﬃliation, in line with earlier work
by Lewis (1980, 1983; Lewis and Jackson, 1985). Yet this relation partly depended
on the sector of public spending. In one of the few existing studies on attitudes to
austerity, Popp and Rudolph (2011) found that ideology inﬂuences support for an
economic recovery plan in an experimental setting, with conservatives being less
supportive. However, they also found that attitudes depended on which politician
actually proposed the plan.
In line with this literature, we expect citizens who place themselves on the left of
the political scale not to be in favour of a reduction of public spending (see also the
research by Francken and Lewis, and Svallfors, 1997). Furthermore, we assume
that politically right-leaning respondents will be in favour of a reduction in public
spending. It is unclear, however, how they feel about public investment to boost the
economy. We expect left-leaning respondents to be against a reduction in public
spending.
The government is wasting our money: the role of political
disaffection
The ideological argument is related to citizens’ wider attitude to government.
Spending preference is probably not just inﬂuenced by whether people think gov-
ernment should intervene in speciﬁc issues and areas, but also by whether they
actually trust government. Indeed, perceived government waste is one of the items
normally used in scales to measure political trust (Craig et al., 1990). This means
that a preference for savings in public services may have little to do with
(macro-)economic or budgetary considerations and more to do with wider attitudes
towards government and its role. This ‘political disaﬀection’ thesis suggests a posi-
tive relationship between political distrust and anti-tax sentiment (Rudolph, 2009:
144) – if you distrust government, you are more likely to think taxes are too high
(Beck and Dye, 1982). Still, contrary to expectations, Rudolph (2009) found that
political trust actually increases support for tax cuts (but only among liberals). He
explained this using a trust-as-heuristic explanation by introducing ideology as an
additional variable. It should be added that while anti-tax attitudes often reﬂect
low trust in government, such attitudes are often not absolute. Hadenius (1985), in
Swedish research, found that citizens thought taxes were too high but they
expressed a much more positive attitude to taxes when the survey question was
presented as a trade-oﬀ between taxes paid and beneﬁts received. In a similar way,
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Giger (2011) demonstrated that, contrary to popular argument, savings and
retrenchment are not always unpopular, and that indeed (welfare state) ‘retrench-
ment is a popular policy choice for some voters’, including when they vote for
religious or liberal parties (Giger and Nelson, 2011). In line with this literature, we
expect citizens who don’t trust their government to be in favour of a reduction in
public spending (anti-government attitude – political disaﬀection thesis). By testing
this eﬀect, we thus test whether people make a choice for savings in public services
based on an anti-government attitude rather than based on budgetary or macro-
economic considerations.
Protecting your own purse: the role of self-interest
A third explanatory factor found in the literature is self-interest. Ferris (1983)
suggests that people make a cost–beneﬁt calculation when preferring additional
or reduced public expenditure. Extra government spending is less burdensome for
high income groups; at the same time, he found that lower income groups prefer
higher public spending in areas such as housing, and that respondents with chil-
dren favour public expenditure in education. Self-interest thus plays a role; when
you are likely to need or beneﬁt from spending in certain areas, you are more
likely to prefer higher public spending in this area (Brook et al., 1997). Research
also found that support for general cuts in social spending is relatively low, while
there is more support for speciﬁc cuts (Roller, 1999). Likewise, support for
spending on development aid decreases in times of cuts and is replaced by
local and domestic priorities (Lindstrom and Henson, 2011). In the literature
on welfare spending, the self-interest argument states that those respondents
who are (potential) beneﬁciaries of welfare-related services are more likely to
have positive attitudes towards the welfare state and related concepts when com-
pared to those who are ‘better oﬀ’. The self-interest argument has been widely
supported by empirical investigations (Edlund, 1999; Groskind, 1994; Hasenfeld
and Raferty, 1989; Svallfors, 1997). Using data from the International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP), Svallfors (1997), for example, ﬁnds that public atti-
tudes towards redistribution are structured by certain patterns, such as class
diﬀerences, within diﬀerent types of welfare regimes. Age also appears to play
a role in decisions about spending for certain welfare services (e.g. pensions)
(MacManus, 1995). The elderly also appear to be less likely to argue for spending
cuts when forced to choose between raising taxes and cutting spending
(MacManus, 1995).
We therefore expect self-interest to play a role in the choice of preferred
policies in response to the ﬁnancial crisis. Vulnerable and economically hard-
pressed groups are more dependent on government-funded programmes and
we therefore expect these groups to be against savings. In line with this argument,
we also expect those groups who are currently receiving welfare services, or have
welfare recipients in their immediate environment, to be against cuts in public
services.
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Macro-economic factors
People’s preference for certain government responses to the crisis may diﬀer across
countries, due to the general state of the economy or the ﬁnancial situation of the
government (public debt, deﬁcit). This is based on the perception that in states
where the economic opportunity structure is limited, citizens are in favour of state
contributions to ﬁll this gap. For instance, commentators have found that public
support for spending on welfare policies is higher in countries where unemploy-
ment is high (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003) and where individuals are experi-
encing economic strain (Blekesaune, 2013). Likewise, Fraire and Ferrer (1995)
found that support for unemployment beneﬁt cuts is lower in countries
with a high unemployment rate. As regards citizen support for hospital
privatization, Battaglio and Legge (2008) found that within countries where
levels of health spending were highest, the support for privatization reforms was
comparatively low.
As a ﬁnal hypothesis, we assume that in countries where government deﬁcits,
public debt and ﬁscal pressure are very high, demands for a reduction in public
spending will be more substantial, possibly because of concerns about government
debt and deﬁcit getting out of hand. In countries where total government expend-
iture is high, we expect citizens to be in favour of a reduction of government
spending rather than preferring further government expansion through taking
measures to boost the economy. In a similar way, we expect a preference for
savings in countries with high tax rates, in order to reduce ﬁscal pressure.
Finally, in countries where GDP per capita change is low, and the economy thus
slow, we expect respondents to be mainly in favour of government measures to
boost the economy, and thus higher public spending.
Data and method
This research examines individual- and country-level factors that account for citi-
zens’ preferences in response to the crisis. Hence, we utilize multilevel modelling
techniques, which allow us to simultaneously examine the eﬀect of country-level
and individual-level variables on an individual-level dependent variable – in our
case, citizens’ spending preferences in response to the global ﬁnancial crisis. The
reasons for using multilevel statistics are (1) to be able to use context variables that
are not available at the individual level, and (2) because attributes of respondents
within the same countries are correlated with each other. This means that the
observations are not independent from each other (Hox, 2010). Individual respond-
ents are thus nested within country groups.
We use data from the Special Eurobarometer 74.1 ‘Europeans and the Crisis’,
collected in August and September 2010 using CAPI face-to-face interviews in
respondents’ homes. A total of 26,635 respondents age 15 and above in the EU
27 member countries participated in the overall survey. They were selected follow-
ing a multi-stage, random probability sample (standard random route procedure
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starting at a random starting address within administrative regions). At these
addresses, a closest birthday rule was used to select respondents at that address.
Approximately 1000 people were interviewed in each country (with the exception of
Germany: 1600; Cyprus: 500; Luxembourg: 500; Malta: 500; the UK: 1300). After
deleting cases with item non-response, a total of 23,652 cases were included in the
analysis. Non-responses appeared to be similarly distributed across countries,
which provides some evidence for the cross-national validity of our measurements.
Operationalization
In this section we will ﬁrst introduce our dependent variable, individual-level inde-
pendent variables and then the country-level predictors.
Dependent variable
The Eurobarometer survey contains a number of questions on the ﬁnancial crisis.
One is particularly relevant for public administration research, as it directly asks
for citizens’ preferences in response to the crisis:
Personally, would you say that to emerge from the crisis rapidly, EU Member States
should ﬁrst reduce their public spending or should they ﬁrst invest in measures to
boost the economy?
Response options were (i) ﬁrst reduce their public spending; (ii) ﬁrst invest in
measures to boost the economy; (iii) both equally (spontaneous). Figure 1 shows
the frequencies for all countries of the EU-27. It reveals major diﬀerences between
countries, with more than 70 percent of respondents in Denmark and Lithuania
preferring to invest in measures to boost the economy in response to the crisis,
while around 50 percent of the respondents in Slovakia and France, for example,
think that it would be preferable to reduce public spending.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Reduce public spending Invest in measures to boost econmy Both
Figure 1. Financial policy preferences (N¼ 23.652), percentages
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What is also apparent in the ﬁgure is that in some countries, a substantial
number of respondents have chosen the ‘both’ option, even though this answer
was not prompted by the interviewer. This has a number of implications for our
model because we cannot directly use the saving–spending dichotomy as a binomial
dependent variable. Furthermore, we assume that respondents opting for the both
category are not only expressing their mixed preference, but also do so because they
were not able to derive a distinct preference for any of the given categories (see
Berinsky, 2005). Therefore, in a number of cases the ‘both’ option may be a sub-
stitute for the ‘don’t know’ category. Thus the focus of our analysis will be on
contrasting those who prefer reducing public spending with those who prefer
investment in the economy as a response to the crisis. Moreover, this assumption
was also supported when estimating a multilevel ordered logistic regression model.
A core assumption of the ordered logit regression is the proportional odds assump-
tion, which assumes similar coeﬃcients across logit equations (Long and Freese,
2006). We did run several speciﬁcations of our model and all violated this assump-
tion. We therefore opted for a multinomial model with three categories in the
dependent variable: reduce spending (1); both (2); and invest (3).1 However, the
focus of our analysis will be on contrasting preferences for ‘reducing spending’ with
‘investing in the economy’.
Independent variables
Due to the hierarchical data structure, we distinguish between determinants at the
individual (respondent) level and determinants at the country level.
Individual level. At the individual level, we include measures for the political ideology
of respondents, political disaﬀection, self-interest (economic strain, home owner-
ship, employment status and welfare recipient status), as well as a range of controls
such as traditional demographic measures (age, gender), marital status, education
and place of residence/type of community.
As regards political left–right self-placement, people were asked: ‘In political
matters people talk of ‘‘the left’’ and ‘‘the right’’. How would you place your views
on this scale?’ The scale ranges from 1 (left) to 10 (right). However, since this
question typically produces a signiﬁcant amount of missing cases we grouped
answer categories in left (1–4 on the scale), middle (5–6 on the scale), right (7–10
on the scale), and missing (all missing cases).
We conceptualize political disaﬀection using a measure which captures the
extent of anti-government attitudes. We added two variables: (1) ‘trust in parlia-
ment’ and (2) ‘trust in government’. Both are measured on a 10-point Likert scale,
and measure an underlying latent construct.2 Scores on both items were added.
A low degree of institutional trust is thought to reﬂect high levels of political
disaﬀection.
Self-interest is measured using a number of variables. Economic strain is mea-
sured using respondents’ answers to a question about their household’s ﬁnancial
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situation: ‘A household may have diﬀerent sources of income and more than one
household member contributing to it. Thinking of your household’s total monthly
income, is your household able to make end meet . . .?’ Answer possibilities ranged
from 1 ‘very easy’ to 6 ‘with great diﬃculty’. This type of item has been previously
used by numerous studies that have looked into respondents’ self-perceived eco-
nomic pressure (e.g. Blekesaune, 2013; Vergolini, 2011; Whelan et al., 2001).
Respondents that experience great economic hardship are more likely to be
dependent on state contributions – be it now or in the future. Employment
status was coded as ‘1’ when currently unemployed or temporarily not working,
and ‘0’ for other. Homeownership was coded as ‘1’ when respondents own an
apartment or a house and ‘0’ for other. Respondents were also asked whether
they (or people they are close to) are recipients of social welfare services (or have
received any in the last 12 months). Those services include long-term care ser-
vices, child care services, public employment services, social housing services
and social assistance. Respondents who are welfare recipients, or have people in
their immediate social environments who are welfare recipients, are less likely to
support cuts in public spending because they would then be personally aﬀected by
the cuts.
Control variables include age, gender, educational status, community size and
marital status. We constructed four age groups: 15–24 years; 25–39 years; 40–54
years; and 55 years and older. Gender was recoded as 0¼ female, and 1¼male. For
educational status, we grouped respondents into three categories in accordance
with their age when they left full-time education: basic education (<15 years),
secondary education (16–19 years) and higher education (>20 years). In order to
minimize eﬀects, respondents who were still studying were assigned to one of the
three categories corresponding to their age. Community size/place of residence
registers the type of community the respondent lives in: a rural area or village
(1); a small or medium size town (2); or a large town (3). Marital status was
coded in a way that ‘1’ denotes respondents who are living in a relationship,
while a ‘0’ was assigned to those who live on their own.
Country level. Actual economic conditions and governments’ actual ﬁscal responses
to the crisis diﬀer across countries (see, e.g. Armingeon, 2012, for an overview of
pro- and anti-cyclical responses). In the analysis, we include ﬁve macro-level indi-
cators at level-2 (country-level): government deﬁcit change, GDP per capita
change (in Purchase Power Standards), ﬁscal pressure, government spending and
public debt. When using government deﬁcit change and GDP change we look at
the 2008–10 period. We use 2008 as the baseline year when macro-economic
impacts of the ﬁnancial crisis started to have a signiﬁcant impact on government
accounts.3 By doing this, we try to take into account the dynamic nature of macro-
economic eﬀects of the ﬁnancial crisis on countries’ budgets and their economic
policy responses. Furthermore, we look at ﬁscal pressure using tax revenue as a
percentage of GDP in 2010, as well as total general government expenditure as a
percentage of GDP in 2010. Country statistics were taken from EUROSTAT
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(GDP, government deﬁcit, government expenditure, government debt) and the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (tax revenues).
Analysis
We estimate a multinomial multilevel model, which allows individual-level pre-
dictors to have diﬀerent estimates on the diﬀerent outcome categories of our
dependent variable. All country-level independent variables are grand mean
centred, which makes the intercept interpretable (Hox, 2010; Luke, 2004).
Estimations were carried out running MLwiN from within Stata, using the
‘runmlwin’ routine (Leckie and Charlton, 2013). Cases with missing values on
any of the variables were deleted prior to the analysis.
In the ﬁrst step of the analysis (model 0), we need to establish how the variance
in opinions within countries relates to variance between countries, and whether
multilevel analysis is actually needed. For the baseline model or the model with
intercept only, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant chi square (comparing a multilevel model with a
pooled one), both for equation 1 (reduce public spending vs invest in measures)
(2¼ 468.3, df¼ 26, p <0.001); and for equation 2 (both vs invest) (2¼ 1228.9,
df¼ 26, p <0.001). This means that individual respondents within a single coun-
try are more alike than respondents in diﬀerent countries, and that a multi-
level analysis is therefore necessary. We furthermore estimate an interclass
correlation of 0.032 which shows that only 3.2 percent of the total variance for
the ﬁrst equation (reduce vs spending) lies at level-2; for the second equation (both
vs invest), 12.8 percent of the total variance can be related to diﬀerences across
countries.
In a second step (model 1), we add the individual-level variables. Table 1 shows
the ﬁndings. Results are reported as relative risk ratios and have to be interpreted
in relation to the third category of the dependent variable (investing in the econ-
omy), which serves as our base category. Our main interest here is obviously not so
much in the second ‘both’ category (reported in the Appendix), but mainly in
contrasting the outcome categories of ‘reducing public spending’ and ‘investing
in the economy’.
Results show that, ﬁrst of all, ideology matters. Respondents who regard them-
selves as left-leaning are more likely to prefer investment in measures to boost the
economy. Those who are right-leaning, in contrast, are more likely to prefer reduc-
tions in public spending. These eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant across all model
speciﬁcations. We also acknowledge the potential endogenous nature of the meas-
ure for partisan ideology. This means that predictors such as economic strain,
employment status, welfare recipient status or education also potentially determine
respondents’ ideology.4 This may bias the estimates of the measure for partisan
ideology. These ﬁndings should thus be interpreted with caution. However, we also
checked how strongly those predictors are actually related with ideology by looking
at their correlations.5 None of them displayed a correlation coeﬃcient greater than
0.12, which provides some evidence that this kind of bias may be minor.
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As regards political disaﬀection we ﬁnd that institutional trust has a statistically
signiﬁcant but negative relationship with preferences for reducing public spending.
In other words, the greater the institutional trust of respondents, the more likely
they are to prefer investment as an appropriate policy response to the global ﬁnan-
cial crisis. Looking at the set of predictors for self-interest, only economic strain
and welfare recipient status become statistically signiﬁcant. It shows that experien-
cing economic hardship increases the probability of preferring investment as a way
out of the crisis. Furthermore, being a recipient of welfare services, or being closely
related to one, has the same eﬀect: they prefer measures to boost the economy as a
way out of the crisis, and not a reduction in public spending. This lends support to
the self-interest hypothesis. Homeownership and unemployment, however, show
no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects.
The same holds true for models 2 to 6, where country-level variables have been
added. Since most of the predictors are strongly correlated with each other, we
examine their potential eﬀects individually. However, none of these country vari-
ables are statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, their explanatory power in terms of
model ﬁt is also rather limited, since they have only a very weak eﬀect on reducing
the variance of (the mean of) the intercept. Furthermore, when looking at the
variance explained by the country predictors, only model 4 (change in government
expenditure) has a minor eﬀect. It increases explained variance at level-2 (when
compared to the null model) by three percentage points. However, given a com-
paratively low interclass correlation of 0.032 for the null model, this is marginal.
All in all we can be conﬁdent in claiming that none of the level-2 variables had a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood of respondents’ preferences in response to the
crisis. These eﬀects are also robust to diﬀerent operationalization of the used indi-
cators (using 2006 instead of 2008 as reference year, or using absolute government
expenditures as an alternative measure). In other words, the macro-economic envir-
onment in a country or the national government’s ﬁscal situation in terms of tax
revenues, deﬁcit, or public debt are unlikely be related to individuals’ preferences
for or against public spending as a response to the ﬁnancial crisis.
As regards control variables, we ﬁnd that age, education and living in a rural
community are statistically signiﬁcant. The remaining non-signiﬁcant variables all
have the expected preceding signs. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd people in the age
categories 25–39 and 40–54, when compared to the elderly, tend to prefer invest-
ments to boost the economy rather than reducing public spending as the best way
to get out of the ﬁnancial crisis. This is probably because when respondents come
closer to retirement, they may fear cuts in this area. Following this interpretation, it
is in line with our ﬁndings regarding the self-interest of respondents. When com-
pared to those who left formal education at a later stage, however, the opposite
holds true for less educated respondents. Interestingly, they prefer reductions in
public spending as a means to get out of the crisis. One potential explanation is that
lower educated groups consider savings to be the logical reaction to deﬁcits.
Respondents living in rural areas are also more in favour of reducing public spend-
ing. This may be so because in rural areas, social capital is found to be stronger
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than in more urbanized areas (Hoﬀerth and Iceland, 1998). Thus, rural inhabitants
favour cuts in public services since they know that their social networks will com-
pensate for potential losses in the provision of public goods. Another possible
explanation could be that rural respondents have a more conservative economic
outlook and compare national economies to households, where savings are the
only solution to a deﬁcit.
In the second part of the analysis, we compared the category ‘both’ to ‘invest’.
This analysis is only of secondary importance for our purposes, and estimation
results are reported in the Appendix. Level-1 variables are statically signiﬁcant only
in the case of age and trust in government: younger respondents are more likely to
prefer investment over opting for the both category. The same holds true for those
respondents with a comparatively high political disaﬀection. In terms of level-2
predictors, again, as also observed for the ‘reduce’ versus ‘invest’ analysis, none of
the macro-economic variables had a signiﬁcant impact on the likelihood of pre-
ferring one of the options over the other. A more detailed discussion of these results
and their methodological implications is provided in the following section.
Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we explored determinants of public preferences regarding govern-
ment responses to the global ﬁnancial crisis. Citizens were asked whether they
preferred pro-cyclical (reducing public spending) or counter-cyclical (investing in
the economy) policies as a way to get out of the crisis. We used a multinomial
multilevel model consisting of individual- and country-level variables. We looked
at four sets of explanations for attitudes to a reduction in public spending in
response to the ﬁnancial crisis: political disaﬀection, ideology, self-interest and
macro-economic conditions. We found that political disaﬀection, ideological pre-
dispositions and elements of self-interest inﬂuence opinions on ﬁscal policies, and,
surprisingly, that country-level macro-economic indicators are largely non-
signiﬁcant.
The individual-level ﬁndings appear to show that a more conservative political
and economic outlook (as indicated by being older, and being more on the right
of the political left–right self-placement scale) are related to a preference for
a reduction in spending, rather than a preference for investment to boost the
economy. These ﬁndings are in line with the literature on welfare spending and
the role of government on the importance of ideology in attitudes to government
spending.
Lower trust in government is related to a preference for a reduction in spending.
This could be interpreted as an expression of political disaﬀection – a belief that
government cannot be trusted with the people’s money, or a belief that government
is not capable of investing wisely to boost the economy (or is not the right insti-
tution to take economy-boosting measures) as a way out of the crisis. Answers to
the dependent variable are then not so much a measurement of ﬁnancial policy
preferences as an expression of distrust in government and political disaﬀection.
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Some of the measures used to assess self-interest also inﬂuence citizens’ prefer-
ences for policy responses to the crisis. Findings are in line with Moore et al.’s
(2010) ﬁndings on ‘loss aversion’. Respondents experiencing economic strain in
their household or who are (potential) beneﬁciaries of welfare services are not in
favour of savings, possibly out of fear of losing out personally.
The most remarkable ﬁnding is that the analysis suggested that diﬀerences in
preferences are only partly explained at the country level rather than at the indi-
vidual level. Yet at the same time we ﬁnd that what we thought to be the most
obvious variables – government debt, deﬁcit change, GDP change, government
expenditure and tax revenue – are of very limited explanatory power. This leaves
diﬀerences in preferences at the country level unexplained. At the same time, only
3.2 percent of variance is located at the country level. This means that it is mainly
individuals’ characteristics that matter, and that macro-level factors seem to matter
very little after all. The next steps in explaining the country-level variance may
focus on alternative explanations, including historic explanations (experience with
previous savings rounds), or explanations related to administrative cultures.
One important limitation of this study is the apparent diﬀerences in response
behaviour across countries, probably related to interviewer behaviour or training
during the Eurobarometer data collection. This is often not acknowledged in other
studies using these data, despite the observation that the methodological quality of
Eurobarometer is inferior to that of surveys such as the European Social Survey or
the European Values Survey (Kohler, 2007). As a result of these diﬀerences, the
number of respondents opting for the ‘both (spontaneous)’ answer on the depend-
ent variable diﬀers widely across countries. This creates a number of challenges in
the analysis. Second, item non-response on some variables remains problematic.
Yet, at the same time we have no evidence of a link with answers to the dependent
variable.
A further limitation, which is unavoidable when using secondary datasets, is
that the items on crisis measures were preceded in the survey questionnaire by
questions on poverty and social services. This may have primed opinions on the
ﬁnancial crisis. However, the battery of questions on poverty and social services
also led to the inclusion of measures on socioeconomic status, economic strain and
welfare recipient status in the questionnaire, which would not have been available
had this Eurobarometer questionnaire focused exclusively on the crisis. Also, the
level-2 variables all relate to the country level, thereby potentially masking regional
diﬀerences within countries. A connected point relates to the measures for deﬁcit
and debt, which focus on central government, even in countries and environments
where a substantial part of government spending, and thus deﬁcit and debt, is
located at the subnational or local level. For example, some federal or strongly
decentralized countries such as Germany, Italy or Spain may exhibit strong regio-
nal disparities.6 However, for the time being, our study has provided a ﬁrst step-
ping stone, and is, unfortunately, limited to the representativeness of the sample at
the national level, which does not allow for disaggregation in the analysis. Future
studies that not only look at the country level but extend the analysis to the
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regional or local level would provide a further valuable contribution to the study of
citizens’ attitudes towards the ﬁscal responses of governments to the crisis.
Further research and implications
The Eurobarometer surveys are conducted for policy purposes and measurement
of concepts is generally done using single items instead of scales. Further research
into public preferences regarding savings and austerity measures will have to
develop more detailed measurement scales to increase both the (cross-country)
validity and reliability of the measurement. The dependent variable only mea-
sured generic attitudes to savings or public investment as policy responses to the
ﬁnancial crisis. Attitudes to savings may diﬀer across policy areas, for example in
favour of savings in arts and culture, yet not in the area of education (see, e.g.
Ferris, 1983).
Our main ﬁnding is that opinions on preferred policy options to cope with the
global ﬁnancial crisis are not just related to ﬁnancial and economic factors but
also to levels of institutional trust and to self-interest. This suggests that what is
measured may not, in fact, be opinions about ﬁscal or economic policy, but
instead wider attitudes towards government and expressions of disaﬀection. It
is therefore risky for policy makers to interpret an attitude in favour of a reduc-
tion in public spending as an attitude that says that a spending reduction is
desirable. An indicator that at ﬁrst sight measures a ﬁnancial policy preference
is then in fact no more than an expression of discontent. Further research will
have to look into the reasons why people use a reduction in spending as their way
of expressing institutional distrust. A ﬁnal important policy implication is that
macro-economic factors apparently do not matter much in the formation of
attitudes to savings. When policy makers want to respond to the crisis, they
will have to develop a discourse that also answers to issues of trust, ideology
and personal self-interest.
Acknowledgement
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s
Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement No. 266887 (Project COCOPS),
Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities.
Notes
1. An alternative approach would be to exclude the ‘both’ category from the analysis and
subsequently estimate a binary logit model. We did so for checking the robustness of the
results from the multinomial models. The estimates obtained were very similar to those
from the results presented in Tables 1 and A1 (results are available upon request).
2. Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93 for the entire sample. In individual countries, Cronbach’s alpha
scores range between 0.96 and 0.81, which provides some evidence for the cross-country
validity of our trust measurement.
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3. When using 2006 (the year of the ‘outbreak’ of the crisis) as reference year, results are
similar to those presented in Tables 1 and A1 (results are available upon request).
4. We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out.
5. We first looked at the original continuous measure for partisan ideology with excluded
non-responses, using conventional correlations coefficients, and then for the single cate-
gories of the ordinal variable of ideology as used in this study by the means of a poly-
choric correlation matrix.
6. We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out.
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics, individual level predictors (N¼ 23,652)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min, Max
Sex 0.463 0.499 0, 1
Age: 15–24 years 0.116 0.321 0, 1
Age: 25–39 years 0.240 0.427 0, 1
Age: 40–54 years 0.265 0.441 0, 1
Age: 55+ years 0.379 0.485 0, 1
Education: basic 0.191 0.393 0, 1
Education: secondary 0.476 0.499 0, 1
Education: higher 0.333 0.471 0, 1
Economic strain 3.281 1.296 1, 6
Employment status 0.084 0.277 0, 1
Homeownership 0.777 0.416 0, 1
Marital status 0.627 0.484 0, 1
Community: rural 0.359 0.480 0, 1
Community: medium/small town 0.358 0.479 0, 1
Community: large town 0.283 0.451 0, 1
Polit. orientation: left 0.243 0.429 0, 1
Polit. orientation: middle 0.337 0.473 0, 1
Polit. orientation: right 0.223 0.416 0, 1
Polit. orientation: missing 0.198 0.398 0, 1
Trust in institutions 4.102 2.333 1, 10
Welfare recipient status 0.350 0.477 0, 1
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